Tudo Irá Acabar

“Saber que em breve estarei morto foi a ferramenta mais importante que encontrei para me ajudar a tomar grandes decisões na vida. Porque quase tudo – todas as expectativas, todo o orgulho, todo o medo do ridículo ou do fracasso – tudo cai por terra perante a morte, restando apenas o que é verdadeiramente importante. Lembrarmo-nos de que vamos morrer é a melhor maneira de evitar a armadilha de pensarmos que temos algo a perder. Já estamos despidos de tudo.”. As palavras são de Steve Jobs no célebre discurso proferido aos alunos de formatura da Universidade de Stanford em 2005, seis anos antes da sua morte. Na verdade, o lendário fundador da tecnológica Apple foi um dos rostos de uma técnica de gestão que conta mais de duas décadas e que está a atrair um número crescente de diretores executivos e gestores de topo em todo o mundo. Daniel Harkavy, coautor do livro Living Forward, chama-lhe a técnica do elogio fúnebre. O processo consiste em conduzir os gestores num exercício de visualização da sua própria morte, levando-os a colocar num papel o que diriam sobre si próprios nas suas cerimónias fúnebres. – https://expresso.pt/dossies/diario/2019-01-14-O-que-tem-em-comum-a-morte-e-a-progressao-na-carreira–Tudo-1

Whiteness

Whereas black studies celebrates black writers and black history, and gay studies brings out gay figures from history and pushes them to the fore, ‘whiteness studies’ is far from a celebratory study. Its aim is that it is committed to disrupting racism by problematizing whiteness. So whereas every other field of race studies is performed in a spirit of celebration the aim of this one must be to ‘problematize’ hundreds and hundreds of millions of people. Of course it might be said that defining an entire group of people, their attitudes, pitfalls and moral associations, based solely on their racial characteristics is itself a fairly good demonstration of racism. For ‘whiteness’ to be problematized’ white people must be shown to be a problem. [The Madness of Crowds: Gender, Race and Identity (2019), Douglas Murray]

Metro Ligeiro de Superfície entre Algés e Falagueira

[2004] – O metro ligeiro de superfície Algés – Falagueira é um meio de transporte mais rápido e com um orçamento menos elevado na sua construção do que o metro subterrâneo actualmente explorado em Lisboa. A nova infra-estrutura visa reforçar a mobilidade na área ocidental da Grande Lisboa pelo que contempla ligações com as linhas ferroviárias de Cascais e de Sintra. A ligação ao Metropolitano será igualmente possível, na Falagueira. A linha Algés – Falagueira contempla 15 paragens: Algés (interface com a estação da CP), Algés-Centro, Algés-Norte, Algés-Miraflores, Miraflores, Outurela, Quinta do Paizinho, Bairro do Zambujal, Alfragide, Alfragide/IC19, Damaia, Damaia (interface com a estação da CP), Venda Nova, Venda Nova Norte, Falagueira (interface com a linha azul do Metro). A distância média entre cada paragem é de 530 metros e o tempo de viagem será de cerca de vinte minutos. O investimento global no metro ligeiro de superfície que irá ligar os concelhos de Oeiras e Amadora está inicialmente orçado em 232 milhões de euros.  O metro irá contar com corredores próprios o que irá obrigar a uma reconversão urbana. Com o objectivo de ser criada uma circular periférica de metro ligeiro de superfície em torno de Lisboa, concluída esta etapa do projecto, a segunda fase compreende a ligação entre Falagueira, Odivelas e Loures. – https://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/metro-mais-curto

Selar Lisboa

Esta linha circular do metropolitano é o coroar da estratégia do Manuel Salgado para Lisboa: um núcleo central com forte concentração de terciário e habitação de luxo (Eixo Central e Avenidas Novas), a que se juntam a Baixa, as colinas históricas e a frente ribeirinha, para usufruto dos turistas e residência de estrangeiros endinheirados. Fora desta cidade para os ricos e os turistas, ficam os bairros municipais, a classe média e os “enclaves” da população trabalhadora de menores recursos que ainda resiste à expulsão para as periferias. Estamos assim perante uma cidade cada vez mais dual, onde a linha circular do metropolitano só vem favorecer, acelerando, o processo de gentrificação e turisficação de Lisboa. Ao mesmo tempo deixa para as calendas gregas o serviço a bairros populares que continuam mal servidos de transportes coletivos. [Fernando Nunes da Silva, antigo vereador da Mobilidade da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, SOL, 2018]

Our Time Has Come

As the manifestations, protests, lootings, vandalism, violence, across the USA and Western Europe happen because of the death of George Floyd, I know our time has come. If the fighting for ethnic pride and justice is undeniably a noble fight, I know that what is happening isn’t about that. It is the first shift, the first time the ongoing Demographic change happening in the West is being felt. Whites are becoming a minority in their former territories and now, for the first time, their power is being contested on the street. The time for a reckoning has come. The political institutions, the colleges, the corporations, the media, the cultural landscape will be forced to open their doors through affirmative action, quotas, diversity… Whites will loose their space. For now. In a decade? We can only speculate…

Cheira a Algo, Cheira a Lisboa

  • 29 de Dezembro de 2019 – Um jovem de 24 anos morreu hoje à noite depois de ter sido esfaqueado várias vezes com uma arma branca junto à Faculdade de Ciências, na zona do Campo Grande, em Lisboa, durante um assalto. O jovem terá sido abordado pelos assaltantes depois de jantar num restaurante do Campo Grande enquanto se dirigia para o seu carro. Os três suspeitos continuam em fuga.
  • 18 de Janeiro de 2020 – Uma rixa em Lisboa, na Mouraria, envolveu cerca de 40 cidadãos do Bangladesh e fez vários feridos. Duas pessoas foram esfaqueadas e outras duas baleadas, confirmou fonte da PSP. O presidente do Centro Islâmico do Bangladesh, Rana Taslim Uddin, afirma que o conflito não envolve a mesquita ou a comunidade e que em causa estão dois grupos rivais provenientes do mesmo distrito no Bangladesh.
  • 7 de Maio de 2020 – Uma dezena de agentes da PSP viu-se rodeada por dezenas de populares em fúria quando procediam à detenção de um homem, de 49 anos, suspeito de ter agredido dois polícias. A situação teve lugar pelas 19h45 no bairro Portugal Novo, nas Olaias, Lisboa. A PSP perseguiu até ao bairro um condutor que tinha cometido uma infração na rotunda das Olaias.
  • 16 de Maio de 2020 – Chamada por vizinhos incomodados com o barulho, a PSP foi ao início da madrugada, no bairro Casal dos Machados,  Parque das Nações, Lisboa, tentar por fim a uma festa de aniversário que reuniria, em transgressão às regras ditadas pelo atual estado de calamidade, cerca de 100 pessoas. Os agentes foram recebidos com tiros, disparados de pelo menos dois blocos de apartamentos diferentes, pedras e garrafas. A ordem só terá sido reposta quatro horas depois. Três agentes ficaram feridos e tiveram de receber tratamento hospitalar, tal como um morador do bairro.
  • 23 de Maio de 2020 – Os moradores da rua da Junqueira, na freguesia de Alcântara, em Lisboa, estão muito inquietos com o que se tem passado no último mês de Maio. As noites são passadas na incerteza de os carros, na manhã seguinte, terem sido vandalizados. Desde o dia 3 de maio que naquela artéria lisboeta já foram incendiados três carros, e 12 viaturas foram assaltadas. O valor dos furtos, avança a PSP, é superior a cinco mil euros.
  • 19 de Junho de 2020 – A PSP de Lisboa interveio em dois incidentes no município de Lisboa que resultaram na morte de um homem, em Carnide, e de um jovem, no Campo Grande. O homem foi baleado pelas costas, num incidente que a PSP acredita estar relacionado “com um ajuste de contas”, tendo sido transportado para o hospital, onde morreu. Noutro incidente, cerca das 20h50, um jovem de 15 anos foi esfaqueado no Campo Grande, tendo as forças de segurança detido um jovem suspeito da agressão com arma branca, indicou a mesma fonte.

Asceticism

Endowed with a pure understanding, restraining the self with firmness, turning away from sound and other objects, and abandoning love and hatred; dwelling in solitude, eating but little, controlling the speech, body, and mind, ever engaged in meditation and concentration, and cultivating freedom from passion; forsaking conceit and power, pride and lust, wrath and possessions, tranquil in heart, and free from ego – he becomes worthy of becoming one with the imperishable. [Bhagavad Gita, 18:51-53]

America’s White Saviors

[by Zach Goldberg (2019), https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/americas-white-saviors]

A sea change has taken place in American political life. The force driving this change is the digital era style of moral politics known as “wokeness,” a phenomenon that has become pervasive in recent years and yet remains elusive as even experts struggle to give it a clear definition and accurately measure its impact. Where did it come from? What do its adherents believe? Is it just something happening inside the Twitter bubble and on college campuses or is it really spreading across the social and cultural landscape and transforming the country as sometimes appears to be the case? In reality, “wokeness”is a broad euphemism for a more narrow phenomenon: the rapidly changing political ideology of white liberals that is remaking American politics. Over the past decade, the baseline attitudes expressed by white liberals on racial and social justice questions have become radically more liberal. In one especially telling example of the broader trend, white liberals recently became the only demographic group in America to display a pro-outgroup bias—meaning that among all the different groups surveyed white liberals were the only one that expressed a preference for other racial and ethnic communities above their own.
Matthew Yglesias described this ongoing transformation as The Great Awokening: “In the past five years, white liberals have moved so far to the left on questions of race and racism that they are now, on these issues, to the left of even the typical black voter.” There is no simple or single explanation for how this process got started. It appears to be driven by an interplay of factors: preexisting tendencies among white liberals; a series of polarizing events like the police shooting of Michael Brown and subsequent riots in Ferguson, and the migrant crisis; the rise of millenials as a political force, and the explosion of social media and “woke” clickbait journalism. The years between 2012 and 2016 were a watershed for white liberal racial consciousness. As white liberals have come to place far greater emphasis on racial injustice, they have also endorsed reparative race-related social policies in greater numbers. This is evident across a range of issues: the rapid growth in white liberals who favor affirmative action for blacks in the labor force; in the increase in white liberals who feel that we spend too little on helping blacks, and that the government should afford them special treatment; in the increase in white Democrats who think it’s the government’s job to ensure “equal income across all races”; and in the increase in white liberals and Democrats who think that white people have ‘too much’ political influence.
An example of how these psychological characteristics and moral foundations can be manifested in politics and policy can be seen in the white responses to measures of empathy toward racial and ethnic minorities. Remarkably, white liberals were the only subgroup exhibiting a pro-outgroup bias—meaning white liberals were more favorable toward nonwhites and are the only group to show this preference for group other than their own. Indeed, on average, white liberals rated ethnic and racial minority groups 13 points (or half a standard deviation) warmer than whites. This disparity in feelings of warmth toward ingroup vs. outgroup is even more pronounced among whites who consider themselves “very liberal” where it widens to just under 20 points. Notably, while white liberals have consistently evinced weaker pro-ingroup biases than conservatives across time, the emergence and growth of a pro-outgroup bias is actually a very recent, and unprecedented, phenomenon. Not surprisingly, data from the American National Elections Studies (ANES) shows white liberals scoring significantly higher on measures of ‘white privilege awareness’ and ‘white guilt’. Previous research has shown that these collective moral emotions, triggered by historical wrongdoing and perceptions that an in-group’s advantages and privileges are illegitimate, can can increase support for reparative and humanitarian social policies. That is exactly what has happened in recent years as white liberals have become increasingly supportive of affirmative action, reparations, and increased immigration.
An analysis of GoogleTrends data shows that the frequency of searches for race-related and “woke” terms has grown substantially since the beginning of the decade—a period that happens to coincide with the social media boom and the emergence of so-called hashtag activism (e.g., Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter). This period also saw the rise of the Huffington Post—an online progressive blog and news site that prolifically opines on race-related issues. Whereas just 13% of white liberals reported regularly visiting the site in 2012, over 30% did in 2016. A similar pattern is observed for digital readership of The New York Times (NYT), which grew from 16% to 31% among white liberals between 2012 and 2016—during this same period, according to a recent content analysis I conducted—the percentage of Times articles mentioning race-related and woke terms saw unprecedented growth. For instance, whereas just 0.4% (or 334) of articles referred to racism in 2012, this figure had doubled by 2015 (to 0.87% or 813) and reached over 2% (or 2,353) by 2018. Interestingly, the number of monthly NYT articles mentioning racism also closely tracks Google search interest in the term. Unfortunately, the outrage delivered through digital media tends to distort this vital perspective. America is perceived as incorrigibly unjust, racist, and in need of radical transformation. Compounding this, the perception of benefiting from such iniquity through white privilege naturally produces heightened feelings of guilt, anger, and an empathic desire “to do something” to help the suffering, or to at least signal one’s moral virtue to others.
It’s the frustration with white conservatives’ inability or reluctance to keep pace with white liberals on the path to enlightenment that is intensifying our political divide. But conservatives tend toward normative and structural stability. They don’t take well to rapid social change. The perceived imposition and spread of progressive norms naturally elicits psychological reactance—a visceral desire to resist and affirm one’s agency in the face of perceived social pressure. This is the very process that is at least partly responsible for the election of Trump. Resentment of those seen as standing in the way of necessary social and cultural change may inspire a commitment to what political scientist Eric Kaufman calls “multicultural millenarianism”: the belief that the demise of a white majority will pave the way for a more racially progressive and just society. Perhaps this is why white support for increasing immigration coincides with more negative feelings toward whites. Whatever the case, such sentiment would have been hard to fathom 10-20 years ago. The digitalization of moral outrage that makes it possible today could, with the pace of innovation, make it even more potent in the years to come.